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Abstract: We conduct a laboratory experiment to examine the performance of a market for 
protection.  As the central feature of our treatment comparisons, we vary the access that 
“peasants” have to violence-empowered “elites”.  The focus of the experiment is to observe how 
elites price and operate their protective services to peasants, and to observe the degree to which 
elites engage in wealth-destroying violence in competition amongst each other for wealth-
generating peasants.  We find that greater access to peasants strikingly increases violence among 
the elites, but with limited access the elites markedly extract more tribute from the peasants.  Our 
findings are particularly relevant to the discussion of violence in developing countries. 
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I. The Provision of Protection 
  
 In the event of conflict, people will protect themselves through whatever means are 
available, be it through personal effort, through contract with others, or through public 
administration.  Typically, scholars divide these institutional mechanisms into two categories, 
private and public, with opinions differing on how effective either mechanism will be.  Becker 
and Stigler (1974), for example, argue that bringing more law enforcement into the realm of the 
market instead of the public domain would provide enforcers with better incentives to 
accommodate their respective clients.  Cowen (1992), on the other hand, argues that such 
enforcement would be susceptible to collusion in avoiding the consequences of conflict with 
other private enforcers and therefore inevitably devolve into monopolistic provision.   
 While this dichotomy is useful in treating the question of how effective the state is in 
providing protection relative to some conceptual private counterpart, the lack of consensus on 
such an important question exposes the limitations of this framework.1  Moving beyond this 
simple dichotomy, North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), henceforth NWW, present a theoretical 
framework based upon the development of historical conflict-reducing institutions, in which 
access to force-empowered persons, not competition (or the lack thereof), is the primary 
institutional incentive in determining how protection is provided.  Their model attempts to 
explain how societies develop economically by managing the problem of violence through 
conflict with others.   
 At the nexus of this violence is a set of individuals with superior force they designate as 
“elites”.  Elites at first can scarcely afford to include any outside persons into their 
organizations.  Thus, the environment is very tribal, conflict-ridden, and with low economic 
production.  Recognition of this cost of conflict, though, encourages the development of richer 
networks of relationships between competing elites.  These organizations consequently become 
more inclusive thereby creating lucrative economic rents for the elites.  These rents are initially 
at the expense of the larger “peasant” population.  However, as the organization of elites 
becomes even more inclusive by incorporating peasants as well, these rents are largely dissipated 
and the state in its modern incarnation is formed. 
The contribution of NWW, which we use as the basis of our own project, is to show how 
the provision of protection emerges along a continuum of structures, resulting from greater 
                                                 
1 See Powell and Stringham (2009) for an in-depth description of this ongoing debate. 
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access to force-empowered elites.  On one extreme of the continuum is a conflict-ridden 
environment where peasants have to compete for access to the protective services of force-
empowered elites.  On the other extreme is monopolist provision of protection through the state, 
which is not imposed but is in fact a result of inclusion of all persons within the network of 
competing elites.   
The important contribution this framework offers is to help scholars move past the 
entrenched discussion regarding the qualities of idealistic, abstract environments, and instead 
investigate how protection evolves in practice, as a result of this greater access.  Building upon 
these considerations, we investigate a market for protection with the institutional feature of 
access as the primary treatment variable of interest.  Our efforts focus upon the following 
question: How does allowing peasants greater access/inclusivity to elites affect the level of 
expropriation and violence (efficiency) in an experimental economy?   
Using a laboratory experiment, we endow a set of elites with the ability to facilitate 
peasant production.  These elites are capable of expropriating earnings from peasants across a 
wide range of options and may further engage in conflict with other elites for control of the 
wealth-generating peasants.  Our treatment variable of interest is the capacity of each elite in 
facilitating peasant production.  In one treatment, the capacity of the elites is constrained such 
that they are not in direct competition with each other in regard to the production of wealth in 
their sphere of influence.  With an excess supply of peasants, the elites are monopolists who can 
use the threat of violence against the peasants in bargaining over the distribution of the gains 
from investment.  In the contrasting treatment, the capacity of the elites is large enough to create 
an excess demand for peasants thus pitting the elites against each other in competition for the 
wealth-generating peasants.    
The question we attempt to answer with these two treatments is, does granting greater 
access lead to wealth-destroying violence amongst the elites vis-à-vis the condition with an 
excess supply of peasants? Or do the elites collude with each other to (a) avoid violence amongst 
each other and (b) expropriate more wealth from the peasants upon the threat of violence.  The 
answer to this question is particularly salient to the ongoing discussion of the institutional 
mechanisms by which protection is provided, which we review below. 
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II. Institutional Mechanisms of Protection 
Before reviewing previous contributions to this important question, it is worth asking if 
the word “protection” accurately describes the services described above.  Would “extortion” not 
provide a more appropriate connotation for this behavior?  As Demsetz argued (1972a, 1972b), 
the distinction economically between supplying a valued service, such as protection, and 
extortion is insignificant.  Both activities involve identical revenues and costs.  Therefore, any 
labeling of private protection as somehow extortive and not protective imputes a non-substantive 
normative distinction.2  Normatively, regarding suppliers of protection as extortive may have 
effects in the laboratory.  Nevertheless, our positive hypotheses provided below are equally 
sound regardless of whether subjects consider protection a desired good or pure extortion (also 
see Skarbek 2011 for extensive discussion along with an empirical example of the relationship 
between protection and extortion). 
An extensive literature has developed around what institutional mechanisms are capable 
of providing protection.  One of the earliest examinations of alternative institutions through 
which protection could be provided is David Friedman’s The Machinery of Freedom (1973) in 
which Friedman argues that protection, along with all other goods, can be provided 
competitively through market processes.   
Following Friedman’s approach, Becker and Stigler (1974) examine the efficacy of 
private enforcement of rules.  They conclude that private enforcement unleashes competitive 
forces which may reduce conflict as or more effectively than public enforcement.  This was soon 
contested, however, by subsequent efforts, which found that a private market for protection 
would be subject to inefficient provision (Landes and Posner 1979) or as Nozick (1974) argues, 
the inevitable establishment of a monopoly due to increasing returns to scale.   
A related debate begins with the assertion by Cowen (1992) that given the effects of 
network externalities, the market for private protection results in the formation of a cartel that 
engages in monopolistic pricing (for responses and counter-responses, see, Friedman 1994; 
Cowen 1994; Cowen and Sutter 1999; Caplan and Stringham 2003; and Cowen and Sutter 2005). 
 As noted above, North, Wallis and Weingast (NWW 2009) break away from this debate 
by confronting the issue at both theoretical and applied levels.  At the heart of their project is 
determining how what they term “natural states” have emerged during the last ten millennia.  
                                                 
2 Consider that the mafia is commonly referred to as a “protection racket”. 
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These natural states are of interest, even to the modern era, as they constitute the vast majority of 
governments past and present.   
A key element of natural states is that they “limit the ability of individuals to form 
organizations” (NWW 2009: 2).  In such societies, a dominant coalition, composed of competing 
force-empowered elites, reduces the problem of endemic violence by restricting access to certain 
activities and services, most notably that of protection (NWW 2009: 18).  These natural states 
are stable, but given that they rely on coalitions of elites capable of using force, exogenous 
shocks to the system can potentially disturb these coalitions, resulting in violence until a new 
coalition is established.  The susceptibility of the ruling coalition in natural states to exogenous 
shocks limits the ability of these societies to develop. 
NWW go on to argue that it is only once this coalition coalesces into a durable, 
centralized authority that the problem of violence is minimized, allowing individuals open access 
to form organizations.  These “open access orders,” of which the authors estimate that only 25 
countries currently qualify (NWW 2009: xii), are less susceptible to exogenous shocks as a 
legitimate monopoly on force is capable of acting as a third party enforcer.  NWW argue that this 
stability, along with the ability for individuals to openly compete for economic and political 
power, provides the key to the development witnessed in these countries in the last hundred and 
fifty years.   
While the debate initiated by Friedman focuses upon the competitive forces (or lack 
thereof) in the provision of protection, NWW instead place the locus of institutional mechanisms 
within the development of coalitions of force-empowered elites.  This coalition can be 
competitive yet conflict-ridden, as is the case when access is limited, to somewhat competitive 
though stable, once access is expanded to include other elites, to monopolistic and highly 
durable, when access includes the entire society, such as is the case with the modern state. 
Though NWW shed light on a number of institutional settings at various stages of 
development, the focus of this paper concerns development within what they label the natural 
state.  Specifically, how does access to surplus-creating elites affect the amount of expropriation 
from peasants to conquering elite and the overall violence (and hence efficiency) of the 
economy?3   
                                                 
3 Powell and Wilson (2008) and Smith, Skarbek and Wilson (2011) use laboratory methods to examine conflict over 
resources, but unlike in our experiment their transfers of resources are zero-sum and there is no deadweight loss 
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With regard to expropriation, as protection becomes more inclusive, the amount of elites’ 
surplus should begin to dissipate given that peasants, who previously were expropriated from, 
are now part of the coalition itself.  Expropriation continues to decrease up until the state 
assumes full control of the protective apparatus.   
The analytical narrative behind efficiency is more complicated.  At first, efficiency is 
very low as investing in economic production is not possible in such a tumultuous environment.  
Once the environment stabilizes, though, then new productive possibilities arise and efficiency 
increases.  However, NWW argue that having competing elites will create episodes of conflict.  
Bates, Greif, and Singh (2002) provide a similar argument as they see widespread decentralized 
enforcement as giving way to “constant displays of military ability or skirmishes” (p. 610).  
Hence, the mere possibility for violence between competing elites, even those within a 
cooperative coalition, can generate wealth-destroying conflict.  This will only subside once the 
state assumes control of the protective apparatus.   
In summary, the position of NWW is that expropriation is minimal and efficiency is 
maximal only once the control of violence resides within a central authority.  Competitive 
provision of protection may be effective in stabilizing economic conditions but will still be 
susceptible to occasional bouts of conflict.  This is still an improvement over the initial stages of 
development when access to the elites is limited, causing pervasive conflict. 
 
III. Experimental Design 
 Our aim is to create an experiment that examines different institutional mechanisms of 
protective services.  To accomplish this, we establish an environment where a minority of 
participants has superior abilities in force that the majority does not enjoy.  We further narrow 
this superiority to the dual functions of protection and expropriation.   
In our primary treatment, twelve participants interact using an online interface.  We 
designate four of these as “elites” and the remaining eight as “peasants”.4  Each experimental 
session lasted approximately 55 minutes comprised of two phases, plus private payment of 
                                                                                                                                                             
associated with the conflict in acquiring the resources.  Wilson, Jaworski, Schurter, and Smyth (2013) incorporate a 
deadweight loss over ownership disputes when catching a freely roaming resource, but the agonists are unable to 
engage in wealth-destroying violence against each another.  
4 We use these labels for the purposes of presenting our design.  We did not label subjects within the experiment as 
“elites” or “peasants” but instead as “castles” and “people”, respectively.  See our instructions in the appendix for 
further details. 
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earnings. In the first phase lasting 10-20 minutes, the subjects read the self-paced instructions 
and participated in a double elimination tournament, the four top performers of which were 
assigned the role of an elite.  Then in the second phase the subjects read the self-paced 
instructions for the task of interest, lasting anywhere from 5-10 minutes, followed by 
participating in a 33-minute continuous term of decision-making.  Finally, the participants were 
privately paid their earnings.  Though the participants were recruited for 90 minutes, we did not 
notify them ex ante of the decision-making length of the session to mitigate end-game effects. 
 
A. Phase I    
The participants read the following instructions after being seated that their visually-
isolated carrel: 
In this experiment there are two types of subjects.  Four subjects will be castles and eight subjects 
will be people.   The types will be determined by your performance in a double elimination 
tournament.   The four winning subjects will be assigned the role of a castle, which is a definite 
advantage in this experiment.  The remaining subjects will be assigned the role of people.  
 
To become a castle, you must win multiple rounds of the Game of 20.  The rules of the Game of 
20 are simple.  One subject will be randomly determined to be first mover.  The first mover must 
then click “1” or click “1” and “2” by the numbers below and then click the Submit button.  Each 
person in turn increases the number by 1 or 2. The person who clicks “20” wins.  The tournament 
bracket is displayed on the right portion of the screen.  Once the tournament is complete, you will 
receive the instructions for the experiment. 
 
This variant of the game of Nim can be solved by backward induction, such that the person who 
clicks “2” wins the game as long as he or she doesn’t make a subsequent mistake by failing to 
click in turn “5”, “8”, “11”, “14”, “17”, and finally “20”.  Following Hoffmann and Spitzer 
(1982) and Davis and Wilson (2000), our instructions and this feature of the design are intended 
to induce the elites to feel entitled to act in their own interest with regard to the peasants having 
“beaten” the peasants in a game of equal opportunity.  Notice that with 12 people, a participant 
must win a minimum of two consecutive games, or more likely, a total of three games to be 
assigned the role of an elite. Thus, dumb luck has little to do determining a subject’s role in the 
experiment.  
 
B. Phase II   
The session begins with the eight peasants located in a neutral territory in the center of 
the screen (see Figure 1).  While in this neutral territory, peasants are unable to produce or in any 
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 We assume conflict between elites to be costly with no net pecuniary advantage.  As we 
specify in our motivation above, the focus of our paper is the economic performance among 
competing elites.  We are therefore assuming the issue of potential gains arising through inter-
group conflict to be already resolved due to the relatively high strengths of the elites.  
Consequently, an attacking elite has no guarantee of success in procuring newly unclaimed 
peasants nor does the attacked elite automatically lose captured peasants, at least when shielded.  
By imposing this constraint, we narrow the rationale for inter-group conflict to enforcing 
agreements among elites through punishment of “outlaw” elites and to acquiring wealth-
generating peasants for one’s self.   
 What constitutes an outlaw elite is, of course, to be defined by the participants 
themselves.  However, note that this punishment of wayward elites yields public benefits, as all 
other elites besides the attacked elite gain at the very least newly freed peasants.  Furthermore, 
this mechanism can be used in a more sophisticated manner to, for example, enforce certain 
minimum thresholds of tribute or even specific distributions of captured peasants between the 
four elites.  Thus, the social gain of punishing “outlaw” elites is greater than the private gain.  
This feature draws upon Cowen’s argument that elites who are able to overcome the public 
goods dilemma of punishing other elites should be able to use the same mechanism in enforcing 
cartel prices.   
 Finally, we incorporate two methods of communication into the online interface.  The 
first method is a public chat room, in which all participants may enter and read text messages.  A 
second method allows each subject to bilaterally and privately chat with any other subject of 
their choosing.  We incorporate this means of using private chat rooms to allow elites to engage 
in greater collusive opportunities.  Without private communication channels, elites would be less 
able to discover and agree upon optimal pricing strategies in how tributes are determined.  Yet 
because ultimately communication is non-binding, this should not interfere (in theory) with the 
rationale for competitive outcomes. 
 
C. Treatment Conditions   
We utilize two treatment comparisons to explore how non-competitive pricing emerges 
within our environment.  These treatments center around the role of “access” to the earnings-
generating capacity of the elite.  NWW employ access as a central feature of their theoretical 
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framework, as elites are able to gain rents by limiting access to wealth-generating opportunities.  
As this access is expanded, more wealth is generated by the greater productive capacity of the 
society as a whole, but the degree of expropriation is simultaneously hampered by the 
competition engendered by this greater access.   
Translating this narrative into our environment, elites should be more capable of 
expropriation under limited access.  Limited access is in a sense equivalent to the monopoly 
provision of protection, explored in our remarks in Section II above.  By limiting access, 
peasants are forced to compete with one another to gain earnings generated by the elite’s 
investment.  When access is expanded, peasants have multiple elites to choose from.  Hence, 
competition among elites emerges and expropriation is reduced. 
We investigate this notion of access using the following two treatments.  In our primary 
treatment, 3Slots, each elite may have up to three peasants at once.  This means not only that all 
eight peasants may reside within the domains of the four elites at once, but that there is excess 
capacity of four slots allowing peasants to rotate (provided they are free or have been freed by 
the attack of another elite).  We expect that peasants will try to use this to their advantage by 
being mobile when able, while elites may find it necessary to utilize inter-elite conflict as a 
means to retain and procure peasants. 
In the contrasting treatment, 1Slot, each elite has the capacity to invest in at most one 
peasant.  Thus, with an excess supply of four peasants at most half of the peasants are producing 
at any time.  (Note the intentional symmetry with the excess supply in the 3Slots treatment.) 
Consequently, competition among peasants is expected to be particularly fierce, with the 
concomitant greater expropriation levels discussed by NWW.  These two treatments differ only 
in the number of peasants who may simultaneously gain access to the elite.  All other 
institutional and environmental features, including the instructions, are consistent across the two 
treatments.6   
 
 
 
                                                 
6 In a single, unreported pilot session intended to flush out any software glitches (there were none), each elite had 
only two units of capacity, the intermediate case between our two treatment conditions in which the capacity of the 
elites is exactly equal to the number of peasants.   
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D. Theoretical Benchmarks 
Through our design, we are able to derive certain benchmark levels of provision, which 
we use to gauge the level of surplus-seeking on the part of the elites.  We derive these 
benchmark comparisons as follows.  First, assume that elites engage in the earning-maximizing 
amount of transfer.  Under involuntary transfer, elites maximize their earnings by choosing an 
expropriation rate of 50%.  By transferring half of the peasant’s generated earnings, the elite 
receives revenue of 4¢ every five seconds from each captured peasant.  Each peasant 
correspondingly receives 0.9¢ every five seconds.   
 Suppose now that the peasant wishes to negotiate with the elite by offering a greater 
amount of future generated earnings through voluntary transfer.  He can do so by offering 
anything from 5-10¢ (from this point on we will suppress the timing of every five seconds), for 
any transfer above 4¢ is an improvement over the elite’s unilateral expropriation from the 
peasant.  However, if peasants are maximizing their own earnings, subject to the constraint of 
potential plunder, then they will transfer no more than 9¢, in which case the peasant earns 1¢ as 
opposed to the 0.9¢ when being optimally plundered.  If the elites compete for peasants in the 
3Slots treatment, the predicted voluntary transfer from peasant is the smallest amount above the 
4¢ that an elite can unilaterally plunder from a peasant.  If the elites do not compete for peasants 
in the 1Slot treatment, then the peasants accept 1¢, which is the minimum amount greater than 
0.9¢ when being optimally plundered, and the monopoly price to an elite is 9¢.  What if elites 
collude in the 3Slot treatment to expropriate greater than competitive returns?  Then, the elites 
will be willing to extract anything greater than or equal to 4¢, their opportunity cost of plunder 
under involuntary transfer. 
 The maximum amount of money that a 12-person economy total in the 3Slots treatment 
could earn in is $253.44 (= 1980 seconds / 5 x 8¢ x 8 peasants) and in the 1Slot treatment 
$126.72 (= 1980 seconds / 5 x 8¢ x 4 slots).7  The average subject then has the potential to earn 
$21.12 in the 3Slots treatment and $10.56 in the 1Slot treatment. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Recall that the subjects earn every 5th second and an elite’s investment of 2¢ generates 10¢ in wealth by the 
peasant. Thus, if the an elite receives revenue of 4¢ every five seconds, her profit is 2¢ every five seconds. 
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E. Procedures 
Excluding a pilot session, we conducted five sessions in each of the two treatments, for 
which we used 120 volunteers, 62 men and 58 women, from the at-large undergraduate 
population at a private university with approximately 5,000 undergraduates.8  Each session had 
twelve subjects who only participated in a single session of this experiment.  For showing up on 
time, participants received $7 in addition to what they earned in the session.  The average 
earnings in the 3Slots and 1Slot treatments, excluding the show-up payment, are respectively 
$15.19 (?? = $8.61) and $9.21 (?? = $5.30). 
 
IV. Results 
 We begin the presentation of our results by breaking down the relative distribution of 
earnings that accrues to the peasant, elite and waste categories for each of our ten sessions.  We 
then further break down these relative distributions to those observations involving involuntary 
transfer and those that are voluntary.  We next present the prevalence of inter-elite conflict for 
each session with comparison across the two treatments.  Following this, we break down the 
inefficiency that resulted not only from inter-elite conflict but from unused production and 
involuntary transfer as well.  Finally, we comment upon several chat transcripts that further 
illustrate our findings. 
 
A. Overall Distribution of Earnings 
The stacked area graphs in Figures 5 and 6 summarize by session the earnings of the 
peasants and elites, waste from expropriation, and the investment and shield costs incurred by the 
elites.  Recall that a peasant is able to generate 10¢ every five seconds from a 2¢ investment by 
an elite.  Note that in the 3Slots treatment, for example, the sum of the earnings and waste need 
not add up to 80¢ (8 peasants x 10¢/peasant), as peasants without investment by an elite generate 
0¢. 
   
                                                 
8 In a single, unreported pilot session intended to flush out any software glitches (there were none), each elite had 
only two units of capacity, the intermediate case between our two treatment conditions.   
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Figure 5. Stacked Area Graph of Earnings, Waste, and Costs in the 3Slots Treatment 
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Figure 5. Stacked Area Graph of Earnings, Waste, and Costs in the 3Slots Treatment 
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Figure 6. Stacked Area Graph of Earnings, Waste, and Costs in the 1Slot Treatment 
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Figure 6. Stacked Area Graph of Earnings, Waste, and Costs in the 1Slot Treatment 
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Note first the difference in the level of expropriation when elites have different 
capacities.  In the 3Slots treatment, the elites barely secured their opportunity cost of 
expropriating 4¢ of revenue per peasant.  Over the last half of the session, the average total 
revenue for the elites was, by session, 33.6, 27.3, 22.4, 20.4, and 34.0¢, which using Wilcoxon 
signed rank test is not significantly different from 32¢ (8 peasants x 4¢/peasant) (V = 3, p-value 
= 0.6875, one-sided alterative of more revenue due to collusion).  Unmistakably and contra 
Cowen (1992), the four elites were never successful in colluding on the terms offered to the 
peasants. 
When the elites failed to achieve their opportunity cost, as in 3Slots.4, the lowest elite-
earning session of the five, it was not because the elites did not use or appeal to violence.  For 
example, at time (in seconds) 785-792, Elite3 tells Peasant8: “at least 6 and 4/you can take 6/just 
not 7”. Later in time 928, Elite3 threatens Peasant8, who is only sending 3¢: “make it at least 6 
and 4 or else ill capture you”.   
Because free peasants are free to move anywhere they please, they must be trusted with 
their freedom. Thus, to induce loyalty, to attract peasants (particularly if you have none), and to 
avoid worrying that peasants may leave, elites frequently offered terms that yielded less than 4¢ 
for themselves.  Continuing with the previous example, at time 1766 Elite3 tells Peasant7 “thank 
you for being faithful/go ahead to 7 and 3 if you want” and to Peasant5 at time 1849, “if you stay 
for a few minutes you can change it to 7 and 3”.  But Peasant7 is not content.  She inquires 
privately with Elite1 at time 1962: “can i get 8 for the first few minutes?/im getting a solid 7 
here”. 
In the 1Slot sessions, on the other hand, competition among peasants was fierce.  Once 
peasants were forced to compete with one another to gain access, elites were capable of 
bargaining for much higher levels of revenue than observed in the other treatment.  The average 
revenue received per peasant (per every 5th second) in the last half of the session was, 
respectively for each session, 5.96, 8.32, 7.38, 6.22, and 7.17, which, using a Wilcoxon rank sum 
test, is significantly higher than in the 3Slots treatment (U5,5 = 25, p-value = 0.0040, one-sided 
test). In the first half, elite revenue per peasant as much lower (3.54, 5.24, 4.79, 4.50, and 4.62), 
but it still significantly higher than in the 3Slots treatment (U5,5 = 25, p-value = 0.0040, one-sided 
test). 
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 Another result of interest is that there was significantly less waste due to expropriation in 
the 1Slot treatment relative to the 3Slots treatment, presumably because a 1Slot elite could 
always boot out a free unyielding peasant (U5,5 = 23.5, p-value = 0.0159, two-sided test). The 
average waste per session (per every 5th second) in the last of the 1Slot treatment was 0.62, 0.08, 
0.05, 0.11, and 0.19¢, whereas in the 3Slots treatment it was 2.24, 0.19, 0.66, 0.66, and 0.74¢. 
For the first half of the session, however, there is no significant difference in expropriation waste 
in the two treatments (U5,5 = 13, p-value = 1.0000, two-sided test). The analysis above was the 
sum of revenue regardless of whether the peasants were free or captured. In the next two 
subsections, we break this down conditional on a peasant being free and captured.  
 
B. Involuntary Transfer 
We next report in Table 1 the same breakdown in distribution revenue generated by the 
peasant but confine the observations to those that take place when the transfers were involuntary.  
This means that only those observations are counted that occurred when a peasant was captured 
and being invested in by an elite.  Once freed, transfer becomes voluntary. 
 
Table 1. Revenue and Waste Conditional on Expropriation and Investment by the Elite 
  Peasant Elite Waste 
Number of 
Periods (%)     Peasant Elite Waste 
Number of 
Periods (%) 
3Slots.1 1Slot.1 
1st Half 2.10 3.37 4.53 0.98 1st Half 2.06 3.48 4.46 0.28 
2nd Half 2.19 3.37 4.44 0.52 2nd Half 1.31 3.83 4.86 0.07 
 
3Slots.2 1Slot.2 
1st Half 2.88 3.00 4.12 0.28 1st Half 1.68 3.53 4.79 0.12 
2nd Half 1.80 3.64 4.57 0.04 2nd Half 2.29 3.39 4.32 0.01 
 
3Slots.3 1Slot.3 
1st Half 1.99 3.35 4.65 0.22 1st Half 2.45 3.31 4.24 0.16 
2nd Half 0.57 2.82 6.61 0.10 2nd Half 3.72 2.76 3.52 0.01 
 
3Slots.4 1Slot.4 
1st Half 1.93 3.46 4.61 0.26 1st Half 1.67 3.60 4.74 0.13 
2nd Half 1.69 3.63 4.68 0.15 2nd Half 5.34 1.76 2.90 0.02 
 
3Slots.5 1Slot.5 
1st Half 1.75 3.53 4.71 0.47 1st Half 2.56 3.19 4.25 0.10 
2nd Half 1.45 3.75 4.80 0.16 2nd Half 2.14 3.40 4.46 0.02 
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Table 1 reports that there is little difference in how elites expropriate across the two 
treatments.  On average, in the second half of the session elites confiscated for themselves 
around 3.44¢ in the 3Slots treatment and 3.03¢ in the 1Slot treatment, which is statistically 
insignificant (U5,5 = 16, p-value = 0.5476, two-sided test).  Note also that the elites utilized the 
involuntary transfer more during the first half of the sessions than in the second half, reflecting 
possibly the time needed to bargain for Pareto-improving voluntary trade opportunities between 
captured peasants and conquering elites.  Finally, we observe far more periods of involuntary 
transfer in the 1Slot  sessions than the 3Slots sessions, which is statistically significant in both the 
first and second halves of the sessions (respectively: U5,5 = 22.5, p-value = 0.0317, two-sided 
test; U5,5 = 24, p-value = 0.0159, two-sided test). 
   
Table 2. Distribution of Revenue Conditional on Free Peasant and Investment by the Elite 
Peasant Elite 
Number of 
Periods (%) Peasant Elite 
Number of 
Periods (%) 
3Slots.1 1Slot.1 
1st Half 7.39 2.61 0.01 1st Half 6.08 3.92 0.21 
2nd Half 4.67 5.33 0.47 2nd Half 3.65 6.35 0.43 
         
3Slots.2 1Slot.2 
1st Half 6.68 3.32 0.71 1st Half 4.07 5.93 0.37 
2nd Half 6.58 3.42 0.95 2nd Half 1.53 8.47 0.49 
         
3Slots.3 1Slot.3 
1st Half 6.90 3.10 0.75 1st Half 4.36 5.64 0.34 
2nd Half 7.17 2.83 0.89 2nd Half 2.53 7.47 0.49 
         
3Slots.4 1Slot.4 
1st Half 6.62 3.38 0.72 1st Half 4.86 5.14 0.36 
2nd Half 7.58 2.42 0.84 2nd Half 3.55 6.45 0.48 
         
3Slots.5 1Slot.5 
1st Half 6.16 3.84 0.50 1st Half 4.81 5.19 0.39 
2nd Half 5.59 4.41 0.83 2nd Half 2.63 7.37 0.48 
 
C. Voluntary Transfer 
Table 2 reports the allocation of the 10¢ when a peasant resided in the domain of one of 
the four elites but was free to move elsewhere. When elites have the capacity for three peasants, 
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they take on average 38% of the surplus, leaving 62% for the peasants in the second half of the 
experiment.  This distribution shifts dramatically when elites have the capacity for only one 
peasant, in which case the elites earned 92% of the surplus on average, leaving the peasants with 
a meager 8%.  This difference is statistically significant in both the first and second half of the 
session (both tests: U5,5 = 25, p-value = 0.0040, one-sided test).  
   
Table 3. Inter-Elite Violence 
 
Cannonballs 
(number) 
Shields 
(sec)   
Cannonballs 
(number) 
Shields 
(sec) 
3Slots.1 1Slot.1 
1st Half 14 2230 1st Half 1 392 
2nd Half 22 2930 2nd Half 0 483 
       
3Slots.2 1Slot.2 
1st Half 6 1142 1st Half 1 0 
2nd Half 12 1802 2nd Half 1 0 
       
3Slots.3 1Slot.3 
1st Half 11 523 1st Half 0 0 
2nd Half 8 59 2nd Half 0 0 
       
3Slots.4 1Slot.4 
1st Half 20 1288 1st Half 5 11 
2nd Half 9 1316 2nd Half 0 4 
       
3Slots.5 1Slot.5 
1st Half 14 1485 1st Half 0 0 
2nd Half 17 1813 2nd Half 0 0 
 
D. Inter-Elite Conflict 
 Below we report the amount of conflict between the four elites, as manifested in the 
purchase of cannonballs and shields. Recall that there is little reason to use cannonballs or 
shields when the elite can only hold one peasant at a time. Each 1Slot elite is the master of his or 
her own domain; any gains from displacing another’s peasant cannot be realized by the attacking 
elite for there is no capacity to house them.  This design feature, however, is particularly 
important for understanding how competing elites in the 3Slots treatment use and defend against 
violence.  As discussed above, elites in the 3Slots treatment do not collude on the amounts they 
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bargain from the peasants, but do they destroy earnings by engaging in violence to secure 
peasants.  Table 3 unambiguously reports this difference.    
In the 3Slots treatment, elites maintained a shield on average for 37% of the session.  The 
average 3Slots session spent $11.67 on defensive shields and about half as much, $6.38, on 
offensive cannonballs.  It is clear from the table that expenditures on violence are not decreasing 
in the second half of the session.  As NWW discuss, natural states are nasty and unstable when 
competing elites have equal access to means of violence for appropriating rents.  
 
E. Inefficiency 
Our final table of results reports the overall efficiency of the sessions, as measured by the 
realized earnings divided by the maximum possible.  Table 4 also breaks down the inefficiency 
into three categories: 1) earnings lost from not investing in a peasant, 2) waste from elites 
expropriating revenue from peasants, and 3) conflict between elites through the use of shields 
and cannonballs. 
Table 4. Breakdown of Inefficiency 
Lost 
Production 
Expropriation 
Waste 
Inter-Elite 
Conflict 
Overall 
Efficiency 
Lost 
Production 
Expropriation 
Waste 
Inter-Elite 
Conflict 
Overall 
Efficiency 
3Slots.1 1Slot.1 
1st Half 0.04 0.42 0.16 0.39 1st Half 0.02 0.24 0.01 0.73 
2nd Half 0.03 0.22 0.21 0.54 2nd Half 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.93 
           
3Slots.2 1Slot.2 
1st Half 0.03 0.11 0.08 0.79 1st Half 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.87 
2nd Half 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.85 2nd Half 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.98 
           
3Slots.3 1Slot.3 
1st Half 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.78 1st Half 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.86 
2nd Half 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.90 2nd Half 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.99 
           
3Slots.4 1Slot.4 
1st Half 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.71 1st Half 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.83 
2nd Half 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.83 2nd Half 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.98 
           
3Slots.5 1Slot.5 
1st Half 0.08 0.19 0.12 0.62 1st Half 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.91 
2nd Half 0.01 0.07 0.14 0.77 2nd Half 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.98 
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While all three sources of inefficiency were more pronounced in the 3Slots treatment, the 
major source of divergence is inter-elite conflict.  Overall, while our 1Slot sessions have one-half 
the potential in earnings, the dearth of violence resulted in more efficient economies. 
 
F. Chat Transcripts 
We now process-trace the differences in our two treatments above using the chat 
transcripts.  The participants unabashedly reveal the differences in their bargaining positions. 
The following conversation from 3Slots.1 typifies a conversation between a captured peasant and 
a conquering elite in the 3Slots treatment: 
Time Speaker Listener  
55 Peasant4 Elite1 i will give you good earnings if you free me  
77 Elite1 Peasant4 but i enjoy your company 
105 Peasant4 Elite1 then let me changes my rate  
112 Elite1 Peasant4 what do you want 
127 Peasant4 Elite1 more then .3 cents hahah 
134 Elite1 Peasant4 oh haha i didnt realize 
135 Elite1 Peasant4 sorry 
164 Elite1 Peasant4 is that better? 
179 Peasant4 Elite1 ya mayeb four cents and ill be quite haha 
 
As the chat indicates, peasants may be captured but still have some discretion over their 
pay in the early minutes of the session.  The elite is apologetic for giving the peasant a low rate 
and increases the peasant’s portion of the surplus.  But then some acrimony over the distribution 
occurs and the peasant sows the seeds of subterfuge. Even while singing the praises of his captor, 
the peasant seeks to gain freedom through the intercession of another elite:   
Time Speaker Listener  
196 Elite1 Peasant4 you are making more than me at the moment 
209 Peasant4 Group Chat castle A is sweet  
226 Peasant4 Elite3 can you free me ?  
242 Peasant4 Elite1 you make 3.3 i make 2.4  
244 Elite1 Group Chat if you want a considerable income, join my castle 
249 Elite3 Peasant4 I already have a full castle! 
262 Elite1 Group Chat the proof is in the numbers 
272 Peasant4 Elite3 bummer  
328 Elite3 Peasant4 ok come on over! how do I free you? 
346 Peasant4 Elite3 you have to cannon ball him  
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351 Elite3 fires cannonball at Elite1 
355 Elite1 Group Chat ow 
362 Elite3 Peasant4 fail... 
376 Peasant4 Elite3 ya haha he has a shield on  
407 Elite3 Peasant4 I tried! 
 
After attempting to be freed by the other elite, the peasant then uses the incident to 
bargain for a more favorable earnings ratio. 
Time Speaker Listener 
410 Peasant4 Elite1 how about i get a bit more then the rest of the peeps man  
421 Elite1 Peasant4 haha why 
436 Peasant4 Elite1 because you dropped how much i make again haha  
451 Peasant4 Elite1 and if you pay me well i wont reble and ask peopel to save em from you  
453 Elite1 Peasant4 it costs money to offer the shield protection plan 
472 Peasant4 Elite1 look at how much d [Elite4] is making  
500 Elite1 Peasant4 can you make more money if i give you more or something 
513 Peasant4 Elite1 ya  
559 Elite3 Peasant4 theres a 50% chance if I fire that I will get him right? 
560 Peasant4 Elite1 3.4 is more like it  
579 Elite1 Peasant4 start making that money haha 
581 Peasant4 Elite3 i dont remember hes oaying me pretty well what would you offer if i cam over  
595 Peasant4 Elite1 oh i am and i appreciate the increase  
600 Elite3 Peasant4 well it's not really your choice... 
619 Peasant4 Elite3 true but my castle is paying me well and i appreciate it  
 
Consequently, even though the elite has captured the peasant, the peasant is able to utilize 
competition with other elites in gaining a more favorable earnings ratio.   
 Our 1Slot sessions display a reversal in these bargaining positions.  As the following 
discussion for 1Slot.3 illustrates, a peasant convinces an elite to abandon her current captor 
through promise of greater returns.  The elite and the peasant then come to an agreement on a 
split that is quite favorable to the elite and the peasant:  
Time Speaker Listener 
137 Peasant3 Elite1 You should ditch the loser you have and take on me. I'm hardworking and loyal. 
259 Elite1 Peasant3 only if you split the money with me where i get 70% and you get 30% 
274 Peasant3 Elite Down 
296 Elite1 captures Peasant3 from the middle area and then frees him.  
300 Elite1 Peasant3 ok do it 
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314 Peasant3 transfers 7¢ to Elite1 and 3¢ to himself. 
356 Elite1 Peasant3 perfect 
 
Peace and tranquility would seem to reign, yet the peasant soon becomes anxious over this 
unfavorable split. 
 
Time Speaker Listener 
390 Peasant3 Elite1 I'll keep it this way for 4 minutes. Then I'll leave unless it your willing to change it to 60%-40% 
397 Peasant3 Elite1 you 60% me 40% 
438 Elite1 Peasant3 what time is four minutes from now 
451 Peasant3 Elite2 Are you making any money? 
457 Peasant3 Elite1 10 minutes 
468 Elite1 Peasant3 you mean 11 minutes 
492 Peasant3 Elite1 ill do 11 minutes is fine 
519 Elite2 Peasant3 well i am now i guess haha 
 
The peasant tries to bargain for a more favorable split by threatening to leave.  The peasant 
further attempts to negotiate with another elite.  The first elite, however, is not without his own 
options. 
Time Speaker Listener 
526 Peasant5 Elite1 whats the split you want 
531 Peasant8 Elite1 castle a you should put me in your castle 
548 Peasant3 Elite2 
If you take on me I'll split the money with 
you 50/50 if you want to take on me 
560 Peasant3 Elite2 damn nevermind 
568 Elite2 Peasant5 what are you trying to offer me? 
599 Elite1 Peasant5 75 me 25 for you would be good 
651 Elite1 Peasant5 ok i'll release my person now and take you 
658 Elite1 kicks out Peasant3. 
660 Elite1 captures Peasant5 from the middle area. 
670 Elite1 frees Peasant5. 
676 Peasant5 sends 7¢ to Elite1. 
 
Elite1 finds two suitors in place of the disgruntled Peasant3.  After receiving a greater offer from 
one of them, the elite unceremoniously kicks out the conniving peasant and gains a more 
harmonious relationship as a result. 
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V. Discussion and Conclusion 
 In this paper, we set out to move beyond the simple dichotomy of competitive and 
monopolistic provision of protection to explore the richer framework presented in North Wallis, 
and Weingast.  We find that the crucial variables of interest in their framework, access and 
violence, are indeed a strong determinant of outcomes in terms of both expropriation and 
efficiency.  Specifically, we find that reducing access increases the revenues of the elites by 
forcing peasants to compete for a favorable earnings ratio, while expanding access decreases the 
elites’ revenues through competition for peasants.   
 Furthermore, we find that while enabling greater access generates more favorable 
earnings for peasants, it comes at the expense of costly violence among elites and towards the 
peasants.  This latter result is indicative of what Greif, Bates, and Singh (2002) called the 
tradeoff between order and prosperity.  As we noted above, they argue that decentralized 
mechanisms of enforcement give way to “constant displays of military ability or skirmishes” (p. 
610).  Consequently, decentralized enforcement can provide order but at a certain cost of 
conflict, which in our experimental environment constitutes the destruction of nearly a quarter of 
the surplus.   Importantly, we also fail to observe collusion among elites to garner greater 
revenues from the peasants.   
The broader lesson of our paper is that the strict dichotomy between monopolistic and 
competitive protective services may be less distinct, or indeed informative with respect to 
expropriation, than the literature proclaims.  As we discovered in our experimental environment, 
surplus to the elites is most directly determined by access to—as opposed to the number of—
force-empowered elites.  That is, when access is open, elites still exercise more force over their 
captured peasants, but this control is tempered by the ability, though limited, of peasants to move 
to the domain of other elites.  When access is limited, however, peasants no longer are able to 
leverage mobility against unfavorable earnings ratios and elites take advantage of it.  This shift in 
the balance of power provides elites with the advantage needed to significantly increase their 
revenues.   
 This finding challenges us in how we depict the state, or whatever entity is providing 
protection.  Instead of claiming that monopolistic provision inevitably results in excess 
expropriation, or equivalently that competitive enterprises would invariably solve the social 
dilemma, we should consider how access and violence interact with the provision of protection.  
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As our results robustly indicate, access and violence may be far greater determinants of socially 
undesirable outcomes than previously understood. 
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To protect itself against a cannon ball attack, a castle can shield the castle and the people in it.  
While the shield is on, 2 cents are deducted from the castle’s earnings every 5 seconds. 
 
When a castle fires a cannon ball at an unprotected castle, each person in that castle has an 
independent 100% chance of being freed.  When a castle fires a cannon ball at a protected castle, 
each person in that castle only has an independent 50% chance of being freed. 
 
